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ABSTRACT 
In everyday life many of the decisions that we make are made on behalf of other people. A 
growing body of research suggests that we often, but not always, make different decisions on be-
half of other people than the other person would choose. This is problematic in the practical 
sense of legally designated surrogate decision-makers who may not meet the substituted     judg-
ment standard. Here we review evidence from studies of surrogate decision-making and  exam-
ine the extent to which surrogate decision-making accurately predicts the recipient’s wishes, or if 
it is an incomplete or distorted application of our own decision-making processes. We find no 
existing domain general model of surrogate decision-making. We propose a framework by which 
surrogate decision- making can be assessed and a novel domain general theory as a      unifying 
explanatory concept for surrogate decisions.  
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In everyday life many of the decisions that we make are made on behalf of other people. For 
example, parents make decisions for their children and spouses make decisions for their partners. 
The majority of these decisions are relatively trivial. For example, choosing a gift or a meal. On 
other occasions, such as end-of life care, these surrogate decisions are profound and potentially 
life changing. This raises the immediate question of whether decisions we make for other people 
are different from decisions we make for ourselves.  
Ageing populations in western industrialized countries have increased old-age dependency 
rates and consequently the number of surrogate decision makers has risen (Age-UK, 2015; 
Ortman, Velkoff, & Hofgan, 2014). For this reason, recent research has focused on the accuracy 
of surrogate decision-making with respect to older adults and carers of people who are unable to 
make informed decisions for themselves. This paints a picture of surrogates often making 
decisions that are contrary to the recipient’s1 wishes, and often also different from the decision 
the surrogates would have made for themselves (Shalowitz, Garrett-Mayer, & Wendler, 2006). 
Investigations in other domains of decision making, including human mate choice (Apostolou, 
2013;  Buunk, Pollet, & Dubbs, 2012; Perilloux, Fleischman, & Buss, 2011); purchasing presents 
or vacations (Jonas & Frey, 2003; Jonas, Schultz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005; Tunney & Ziegler, 2015); 
standard gambles (Fernandez-Duque & Wifall, 2007; Ziegler & Tunney, 2015); decision-making 
by general practitioners (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012); and end of life care (Fagerlin, Ditto, 
Danks, Houts, & Smucker, 2001; Shalowitz et al., 2006), paint a pattern of decision making 
which is sometimes described as accurate (reflecting the choice the recipient would have made), 
better (different by way of approaching an optimum benchmark), or the same (in that the 
choices for self and recipient did not differ). Given the disparity of the results and the lack of 
overlap between domains studied, no unified no unified account of surrogate decision-making 
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has yet been proposed. This is a significant gap in the psychological literature that we believe can 
be bridged with the model that we describe here.  
We do not propose that people possess any additional decision-making processes other than 
those that have already been described elsewhere (Kahneman 2011), rather that the change in 
perspective from oneself to another person affects the decisions that we make on behalf of other 
people. By conceptualizing decisions for others as categorically different to decisions made for 
self, the pattern of results in the literature cannot be understood. But the pattern becomes 
predictable ones we assume that decisions for self and others are influenced by a number of 
factors of which some are internal to the decision-maker and some are contextual. The nature of 
the decision and the distance between the decision maker and the one the decision is made for 
are the overarching factors influencing the decision. From the existing empirical literature we 
have identified intent, significance, accountability, calibration, and empathy as factors that feed into and 
bias the process. We present evidence for their influence and quantify their role in our model of 
decision-making in the remainder of this paper.  
Perspective of the decision-maker 
Surrogate decisions fall into four main categories with respect to the difference in the 
surrogate’s intention and ability to model the recipient’s wishes and with what the surrogate 
decision maker believes the main outcome to be. A useful framework with which to assess the 
accuracy of surrogate decision making therefore reflects the perspective of the decision maker. 
These perspectives are outlined below.  
Egocentric. The putative surrogate may simply fail to model the recipient’s wishes and instead 
make a decision on the recipient’s behalf that maximizes the surrogate’s own, rather than the 
recipient’s, outcome. This could occur because the decision maker is essentially selfish, ill willed, 
or unable to adopt the perspective of another per- son. Whatever the reason or motive, the 
5 
Surrogate decision-making 
 
egocentric surrogate decision maker is an oxymoron. Any agreement between the recipient’s 
wishes and those of the supposed surrogate occurs by accident rather than by design.  
 
Simulated. The decision maker attempts to model the goals and desires of the recipient. This is 
the basis of the substituted judgment standard in medical decision making, and the legal 
expectation in the United States (Stanley, 1989). It is assumed in this normative model that next 
of kin can set aside their own preferences and make decisions that accurately reflect the wishes 
of the recipient. The accuracy of the surrogate’s decision is the extent to which it matches that of 
the recipient. This kind of surrogate decision making is the one that we might optimistically hope 
is the most common. One aim of our model is to explain why, when surrogates intend to make a 
fully substituted judgment (the decision that the recipient would have made if he or she were 
capable), they may fail to accurately simulate the recipient’s wishes.  
Projected. The decision maker decides what he or she would do, or prefer, if he or she were in 
the recipient’s situation and chooses accordingly. The surrogate’s intentions are good (with 
respect to the normative expectation), but the judgment is based on the decision maker’s own 
utility functions or goals, and the decision maker assumes that the recipient’s utility function or 
goals are similar. The decision maker is cognitively capable of a first-order simulation of what he 
or she would prefer in a hypothetical scenario but fails to construct a second-order simulation of 
what another person might do. As is the case with simulation, the accuracy of the projected 
surrogate deci- sion is the extent to which it matches that of the recipient.  
Benevolent. The decision maker decides what he or she thinks is best for the recipient      
irrespective of the recipient’s actual or simulated goals or desires. The judgment is based on an 
appraisal of the utility of the outcomes—not necessarily the surrogate’s own, but on the basis of 
his or her perspective of the situation. Since the decision is not intended to match the recipient’s 
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wishes, any match is incidental. Thus, a benevolent decision can be errorful in terms of intent 
but not outcome (i.e., the decision maker coincidentally makes a choice that the recipient would 
like) or errorful in both intent and outcome (i.e., the decision maker chooses an option that the 
recipient would not choose him- or herself). This sort of decision making may well be common 
among parents, politicians, and selfish partners, but it is in the case of medical decisions that  
ethical issues arise with respect to informed consent, end-of-life care, and so on. Note that a 
strictly benevolent decision that contradicts another person’s wishes is unlikely ever to be       
desirable (Dixon & Smalley, 1981; Jones, 1994), and although the best interest standard adopted 
in the United Kingdom (“Mental Capacity Act,” 2005) requires benevolent decisions when the 
patient’s precise wishes are unknown or unreasonable, this still requires some consideration of 
the recipient’s values.  
A Model of Surrogate Decision-Making 
We have outlined four perspectives that a surrogate decision maker might adopt in making a 
decision on behalf of another person and that are essential as elements of a framework on which 
to build a theory of surrogate decision making. How, then, does a decision maker decide what 
the appropriate response is when making a surrogate decision? The model of surrogate decision 
making that we propose has two components: perspective taking and a simple choice rule (see 
Fig. 1). 
Taking perspectives 
From subjective experience, it seems reasonable to assume that in making a decision on 
behalf of another person, a decision maker would ask, “What would I do in that situation?” 
“What do I think is best for the other person?” and “What would the other person want?” If the 
decision maker fails to do so and, instead, computes his or her own egocentric preference for the 
outcome, either because of a failure of empathy or by selfish intent, then the decision maker fails 
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to be a surrogate. In the model that we propose, the surrogate decision maker facing a    
significant decision intends to simultaneously construct all four perspectives in the computation 
of the relative merits of each outcome. That is, decision makers examine the choice in terms of 
what they would do if they were in the other person’s position (projection), what they believe the 
other person would choose to do (simulation), what the other person should do (benevolent), 
and what is the best outcome for the decision maker (egocentric). The surrogate’s ability to 
adopt another person’s perspective is assumed to be determined by his or her ability to engage in 
the perspective-taking component of empathy (Davis, 1983), or to construct a second-order 
mental model of another person. So, in situations in which the surrogate and the recipient have 
different goals and values that are likely to affect the choice that is made, the surrogate’s ability 
to detach from his or her own preference will be determined by empathetic perspective-taking 
ability. Although it is unlikely that a decision maker would admit to making a wholly egocentric 
surrogate decision, it seems likely that this perspective will nonetheless have some influence on 
the decision that is eventually made. However, we also think that it is inevitable that a surrogate 
decision maker will construct a projected and a benevolent mental model even when, as in the 
case of end-of-life care, instructed to construct only a simulated decision. In light of this, how 
does the decision maker decide which perspective is the best?  
 
Choosing between perspectives: The choice rule 
Once the surrogate decision maker has constructed the four perspectives and attempted to  
compute the relevant expected outcomes, a final choice must be made. In situations in which the 
simulated and projected preference is the same as the benevolent option, the outcome is        
essentially rational. However, the model requires a choice rule in the likely scenario that the    
perspectives produce differ- ent preferences. We propose a simple weighted linear choice rule in 
which the decision maker selects the majority option from the four perspectives that have been 
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modelled. Both internal and external factors—namely, intent, significance, accountability,       
calibration, and empathy—determine the voting weight for each perspective and the relative 
importance given to each (see Table 1). For example, if the surrogate intends to make a totally  
egocentric decision, then that perspective has a voting weight of 1, and the remaining            
perspectives either are not computed or, if they are computed, are ignored. Either way, the result 
is that the remaining voting weights are set to 0. Similarly, if the surrogate intends to make a 
benevolent decision, then that voting weight will be set higher than the simulated perspective. In 
this way, the benevolent decision maker can ignore the wishes of the recipient of the decision in 
cases where the two perspectives disagree. We suspect that this arrangement of voting weights is 
common among naive parents.  
As in any form of decision making, the significance of the outcome is likely to affect the     
computation of alternative perspectives. Standard laboratory gambles often appear to be       
suboptimal—perhaps because they tend to be made on the basis of heuristics—when the      
financial outcomes are hypothetical, compared to when they are larger and the effort of         
engaging in analytic processing is worthwhile (Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002; Tunney & 
Shanks, 2002). In line with this, surrogate decision makers are more likely to go to the effort of 
computing and considering all possible perspectives when making profound decisions such as 
decisions about their parents’ end-of-life care than they are when choosing dinner for their   
children.  
In general, people may be less likely to be asked to justify trivial decisions than they are to      
account for profound ones. Accountability might take the form of the expectation that we will 
have to verbally justify our deci- sions either to the recipients themselves or in a legal context 
such as a tribunal or an inquest. Decisions that we expect to be held accountable for are more 
likely to involve the computation of all possible perspectives and appropriately weighted votes. 
For example, a next-of-kin end-of-life decision is expected to be a fully simulated surrogate    
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decision, in which case the decision maker should be able to state that all possible perspectives 
were considered and that the patient’s simulated perspective was given the greatest weight. On 
the other hand, one might expect that parents making either a trivial (e.g., about dinner) or    
profound (e.g., about blood transfusion) decision on their child’s behalf would give a greater 
weight to the benevolent perspective and in many cases underweight their own egocentric    
preferences or the simulation of their child’s preferences.  
Surrogate decision makers are more likely to know or be able to predict decisions for people 
with whom they are more familiar (Tunney & Ziegler, 2015; Ziegler & Tunney, 2012). Our 
model incorporates the notion of calibration, which captures the construal or psychological 
distance between the surrogate and recipient (Trope & Liberman, 2010) and is a measure of how 
accurate the surrogate decision maker believes his or her simulated decision to be. Surrogates are 
likely to believe that they are not likely to be accurate (i.e., well calibrated) in predicting the 
wishes of a recipient who is remote in construal distance compared to someone with whom they 
are more familiar. Thus, perceived calibration affects the weighting that the surrogate places on 
his or her simulated judgment. Surrogates making decisions for recipients who are far in 
construal distance may place less voting weight on that perspective than on a projected 
perspective. For this reason, decisions made on behalf of strangers may be more optimal than 
those made for people with whom we are more familiar, such as our relatives (Tunney & Ziegler, 
2015; Ziegler & Tunney, 2012). On the other hand, surrogates may place a greater voting weight 
on a simulated            perspective than a projected or benevolent perspective for recipients with 
whom they perceive themselves to be well calibrated.  
Summary 
Decisions for others are often assessed as a function of how close they are to the stated 
wishes of the surrogate. This often paints a bleak picture of differences between the surrogate 
decision and the decision that the recipient would have made were he or she able to do so. 
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However,   surrogate decision makers may not have as their goal to match the wishes of the 
recipient, but instead to make what they perceive to be an optimal or benevolent deci- sion. The 
model of  surrogate decision making that we propose has at its core the notion that, in 
attempting to make decisions on behalf of other people, the decision maker simulates his or her 
own preferences and the perceived preferences of the other person.  
We present a framework by which we can assess the intention and accuracy of surrogate 
decision makers in the existing literature and that we hope will frame future research. In 
particular,      research should consider the extent to which a surrogate decision may be a 
projection of the surrogate’s own wishes, a benevolent recommendation, or a true simulation of 
another person’s mind. The model that we present captures the cognitive component of 
empathy (perspective taking) that provides a normative benchmark for the accuracy of a 
surrogate decision maker. Our model also describes how an individual decision maker’s ability to 
simulate another  person’s decision-making processes and anticipate his or her wishes is likely to 
be distorted  according to internal factors such as the decision maker’s emotional ability to 
empathize with another person and external factors such as the psychological distance between 
the two people. For cases in which these perspectives disagree, we propose a simple choice rule 
that predicts  situations in which a surrogate decision maker might accurately reflect the 
recipient’s wishes and situations in which the decision maker may fail to do so. To our 
knowledge, there exists no other domain-general model of the psychological processes that 
underlie what is actually a common, critically important, and increasingly needed human faculty.  
 
Note  
1. We use the word recipient to denote the person for whom the surrogate makes the decision. 
In some circumstances, the word ward or legatee may be more appropriate. The word             
beneficiary may not be appropriate, since there are circumstances in which the recipient may not 
benefit from the decision.  
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: A model of surrogate decision-making in which the decision-maker simulates the 
choice outcomes and decides among them using a simple choice rule. Choice weights are 
determined by the decision-maker’s intentions and familiarity with the recipient. 
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Table 1. Categories, Relevance, and Weighting of Biasing Factors in Surrogate Decision Making  
 Biasing factor 
 Intent Empathy Significance Accountability 
Explanation of 
Category 
The intention of the de-
cision-maker in choosing 
a perspective, e.g. benev-
olent, projected, egocen-
tric, or simulated. 
An individual difference 
internal to the decision-
maker.  
The likely impact of the 
outcome of the decision 
that is external to the de-
cision-maker. 
The likelihood that the 
surrogate will be required 
to explain and be held ac-
countable for their deci-
sion. 
ship between the deci-
sion-maker and recipient. 
Incorporates psychologi-
cal and construal dis-
tance. 
Relevance and 
weighting 
Selfish decision-makers 
may place greater weight 
on an egocentric per-
spective, the benevolent 
decision -maker might in-
tend to make a best-in-
terest judgement and 
weigh they perspective 
accordingly. 
In many circumstances 
the surrogate decision 
maker is unlikely to ad-
mit to adopting an ego-
centric perspective, but 
the model assumes that 
even underweighted per-
spectives will have an in-
fluence on the ultimate 
choice. 
More empathic people 
are likely to understand 
that other people might 
have different prefer-
ences than themselves 
and assign a greater 
weight to the simulated 
perspective.  
Less empathic people 
may believe that other 
people have similar pref-
erences to their own and 
assign a greater weight to 
the projected perspective. 
Decisions with profound 
consequences are more 
likely to be weighed to-
wards the required 
benchmark (substituted 
judgement or best inter-
est). End of life decisions 
are more likely to be sim-
ulated for well-calibrated 
people, and either pro-
jected or benevolent for 
poorly calibrated people.  
Decisions with trivial 
consequences are more 
likely to vary in the deci-
sion weights dependent 
upon the surrogate’s in-
tent or accountability of 
decision -making.  
Decisions for which the 
surrogate is likely to be 
held accountable will 
place greater weight on 
the required perspective. 
For example a parent 
might place greater 
weight on the benevolent 
perspective while a life-
partner might place 
greater weight on the 
simulated perspective. 
Decisions that are un-
likely to require account-
ability will be determined 
by the intentions of the 
decision maker. 
or more familiar with the 
recipient are likely to be-
lieve that a simulated per-
spective is an accurate 
prediction of the recipi-
ent’s preferences and 
give that perspective the 
greatest weight.  
Surrogates who are far in 
construal distance or un-
familiar with the recipient 
may not have confidence 
in a simulated perspec-
tive and may instead as-
sign a greater decision 
weight to either a projected 
or a benevolent perspective. 
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